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Introduction
A great number of debates in philosophy of science focus on the properties of, and relations between, particular, named scientific theories. Just some of the examples in the literature are as follows: (i) debates about the consistency of classical mechanics, classical electrodynamics, Bohr's theory of the atom, and Newtonian cosmology; (ii) debates about whether the following theories are deterministic: classical mechanics, general relativity, quantum mechanics, and evolution theory; (iii) debates about the time-reversal-invariance of classical mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and quantum mechanics; (iv) debates about whether particular theories make particular predictions (too many to mention); (v) the debate about the mutual consistency of quantum theory and general relativity, the debate about the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and the debate about the (non-)identity of Schrödinger's wave mechanics and Heisenberg's matrix mechanics. Clearly all such debates crucially depend on the content that is ascribed to the theory or theories in question. Accordingly, any such debate may be disrupted by cross-talk if two proponents use a theory-name to refer in two subtly different ways. And any such debate will be seriously compromised if two proponents disagree on the (debate-relevant) content of the theory/theories in question.
In fact the opportunities for using theory-names in different ways and for deeply entrenched disagreements on theory-content are legion. For eighty years the major debates about theories have focused on their overall nature and structure, but even here agreement has not been forthcoming. It is still debated whether theories are made up of (or best represented as) axioms of first order logic, propositions, abstract models, model-theoretic models, Bayes nets, a state-space or phase-space, configurations of synaptic weights, 'façades', or a combination of different types of representational media.
1 If this covers the 'nature' of theories, there still remains the question of the 'structure' of theories. Do they have a finite set of specifiable constituents, or a 'core' or 'essence' and an 'auxiliary belt'? 2 Do they have an 'open' or 'closed', or 'mechanistic', or 'modular' character? 3 But this is just the tip of the iceberg. Even if philosophers of science agree that theories are finite, specifiable sets of propositions (say), they may still disagree on precisely which set of propositions counts as 'the theory' in a given case. Philosophers of science often disagree on where to separate the theory from the 'background assumptions', the physics (say) from the maths, the theory from its idealizations, approximations, and simplifications, and the theory from its interpretation, or the underlying metaphysics. This is often because, at a deeper level, they disagree on whether theories are instruments for calculation, predictive or explanatory 1 For a flavour of the range of opinions, see Suppes (1967) ; Van Fraassen (1980) ; Giere (1988) , Ch.3; Suppe (1989) ; Churchland (1989) ; Mahner and Bunge (1997), §9.3; Da Costa and French (2003) ; Wilson (2006) ; Henderson et al. (2010); Muller (2011) .
2 Gould (2002) ; Morrison (2007) ; Lakatos (1970) . 3 Bokulich (2006) ; Craver (2002) ; Darrigol (2008) .
devices, representations of our beliefs, or our working hypotheses, or any of a number of other possibilities.
These considerations might lead us merely to appreciate one of the reasons the debates mentioned above are usually so difficult, and recognisable progress often so slow: disagreements about the properties of, and relations between, particular, named theories supervene on deeper disagreements about the content of the theory or theories in question. But one might also wonder whether this supervenience relation might be severed by some kind of debate-reformulation strategy. There is plenty of inspiration in the literature: in recent years debate reformulations have become popular, especially those which urge the elimination of some concept (e.g. Machery
2009
). If the theory-concept is causing so much difficulty in so many debates, we might wonder what would happen if it were eliminated.
Since scientific theory is such a central concept in philosophy of science, one's intuition may be that theory eliminativism will cause chaos and prevent us from talking about most of the things we want to talk about. On the contrary I will argue that, at least for the class of debates mentioned above-concerning particular, named theories-it can be an extremely powerful tool for the philosopher of science: it is possible to reformulate debates so that reference to 'the theory' and use of theory-names is completely eliminated, whilst retaining all of the questions that really mattered to the original debate. In this way a major obstacle to progress in philosophy of science is removed. More exactly, I will argue that we should expect the benefits of a theoryeliminating debate-reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of debates of the relevant type. I start with two concrete cases by way of example, before turning in later sections to the general story, consideration of benefits versus costs, and responses to objections.
Is Classical Electrodynamics Inconsistent?
My first example is the recent debate as to whether 'classical electrodynamics' (CED) is inconsistent. Frisch (2005) argues that 'the theory' is inconsistent, but Muller (2007) The question arises whether this should really be described as a reformulation of the same debate, or whether a different debate altogether is being conducted post-reformulation. Obviously the debate has changed to some degree, and if the concept of a theory is really going to be eliminated some questions will disappear. The most obvious is 'But is that really classical electrodynamics you're talking about?' I happen to think this is a bad question, based on a false premise, but there is no need for me to argue that here. It will be enough if I can show that, once one has filled in the three sets of square brackets in the reconstruction given above, asking this further question about whether we're still talking about CED will not add anything of interest or importance vis-à-vis inconsistency in science, or how science works more generally.
In fact, Frisch fills in the first two sets of square brackets perfectly well (2005, p.33ff.) . The big question, though, is why (if) it is an interesting or important result. There are two obvious ways in which an inconsistency in science might be interesting, both of which can be articulated and debated without making reference to 'the theory'. First, it might be that all of the inconsistent assumptions were genuinely believed by scientists (or at least believed to be candidates for the truth). This would only really happen if scientists were unaware that the assumptions are inconsistent, in which case it might then be interesting to analyse why, precisely, the inconsistency wasn't noticed, and consider whether there are similar blind-spots in other corners of science. However, it is clear that the assumptions Frisch presents were not all considered 'candidates for the truth', so Frisch's inconsistency could never be interesting in this sense.
The second obvious way in which an inconsistency can be interesting/important is when all of the assumptions in question were used by scientists, even if they weren't considered 'candidates for the truth'. This is actually quite a common occurrence: it is well known that idealization and approximation techniques are ubiquitous in science, especially in physics.
Especially interesting here is when the relevant de-idealizations are not possible (perhaps because the mathematics is intractable): in such circumstances one is sometimes forced to work with an inconsistent set of assumptions. In such a case the question arises how one can judge which derivations are trustworthy. Since one is working with assumptions at least one of which is definitely false, even if one makes use of truth-preserving inferences one often has no way of knowing whether a given inference has taken one from close-to-truth to far-from-truth.
It may look like Frisch's assumptions match this latter case. Certainly his assumption about the Lorentz force equation is naturally described as an idealization assumption, and it turns out severe problems accompany any attempt at de-idealization. So one might defend Frisch by explaining his claim as one where the inconsistency of the assumptions in question is interesting because it is a case of scientists routinely reasoning with inconsistent assumptions. One might then examine this reasoning further, assessing how scientists went about judging which inferences were trustworthy, and whether there are lessons for how scientists should reason in the face of inconsistencies in current science (e.g. the conflict between general relativity and quantum theory).
Whether Frisch's claims are in fact defensible in this way is not the point of current concern.
The worry was that, in making the reformulation, something important is lost from the original debate. But the discussion just given shows how whatever it is that may be important about
Frisch's original claim does not require mention of 'classical electrodynamics' or 'the theory' for articulation and discussion. One may ask how we would answer the question 'But is that really CED you're talking about?' The answer will be that that is beside the point. One might reply: This shows one sense in which nothing of significance is lost if we reformulate the debate according to the above schema. Personally I find it difficult to imagine how else something important could be left behind if we eliminate theory-talk. Some further considerations on this point will be discussed in §4, below.
3 Is Classical Mechanics Deterministic?
Before I turn to the general story it will be instructive to see how theory eliminativism applies in another case, concerning a different theory and a different property. One obvious candidate is the longstanding debate as to whether 'classical mechanics' (CM) is deterministic. Several authors have urged that it is indeterministic, whereas others maintain that it is deterministic, such that one reaches the opposite conclusion only by misunderstanding 'what the theory is'. In this way, any disagreements about whether classical mechanics is deterministic based on disagreements about what the content of the theory is will disappear from view. In this way, progress is much more readily achievable on the question of whether there are any interesting or important indeterminisms concerning hypotheses made about the mechanics of moving bodies.
But as with the case of the consistency of CED, the major question which arises is whether in eliminating reference to 'the theory' we lose something important from the original debate.
What is important about the original debate? Perhaps the most obvious answer is that, if it can be shown that classical mechanics is indeterministic, then one might be well placed to argue that individuals in the history of science were implicitly committed to something they would have wanted to reject. This would be interesting since it raises the questions of why they didn't notice, how it would have changed things if they had noticed, and what we can learn from this about things we might be blind to in current science.
But these issues can be debated more efficiently without talk of 'classical mechanics' or 'the theory'. First (i) one can identify the assumptions pertinent to the point one is trying to makee.g. Newton's three laws of motion. Second (ii) one can show that, given these assumptions, the mechanics of bodies is indeterministic (say) in certain contexts. Then (iii) one has to make the case that this is interesting/important. For example, one might carry out some historical work to argue that relevant characters from the history of science (1) accepted these assumptions, (2) weren't aware of the indeterminism, and (3) would have found the indeterminism intolerable, had they been aware of it.
Opposition to this story can then also proceed without reference to 'classical mechanics' or 'the theory'. One may argue that the indeterministic 'contexts' in question are either 'unphysical' or make use of 'inadmissible idealizations' (Norton 2008) . One might argue that relevant scientists made other assumptions, in addition to Newton's laws, which do then assure determinism in the given contexts (Korolev 2007) . Or one might argue against the claim that Newton's laws by themselves entail indeterminism, either claiming that Newton's laws in fact do assure determinism when properly understood (Zinkernagel 2010) , or by arguing that Newton's laws by themselves entail neither determinism nor indeterminism (Wilson 2009) . In this way everything we might want to say can be said. Adding claims such as "classical mechanics actually consists of more than just Newton's laws" or "determinism is an axiom of classical mechanics" add nothing of value, and only cause the sorts of damaging disagreement and miscommunication noted above. The answer to the question "But is that really the theory you're talking about?" will follow the model of the previous case study (above).
Costs and Benefits of Theory Eliminativism
Extension to the general case is straightforward. For any claim that might be made of the form "Theory T has property X" one can say instead,
Here is a set of analysanda which have the property X [. Mutatis mutandis for debates about relations between particular theories. The important question now is why we should expect such a reformulation to be beneficial to a 'highly significant number' of the debates mentioned in §1, above.
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First of all it is clear that the reformulation process will eliminate talk of 'the theory', and use of theory-names, for every such debate. This has some immediate benefits: miscommunication due to subtle differences in intended reference of theory-names ceases to be possible. More importantly, any stalemates due to deeply entrenched disagreements about the content of the theory in question are dissolved. This is because one does not just eliminate a word, keeping the corresponding concept in the background guiding one's analysis. Instead the debate continues entirely without the concept theory and (crucially) without other concepts dependent upon the concept theory. One talks instead in terms of the specified analysanda (assumptions, models, equations, axioms, whatever), one's conceptions of which do not depend on one's theory-concept, since they are more basic.
These will be important benefits of theory eliminativism only if there existed in the original debate some cross-talk or disagreement concerning the theory-content in question. Probably this won't happen in every case: in some debates we might expect that any disagreements over theory content will concern content that isn't at issue for the property or relation in question. E.g. if we are debating whether a theory makes a given prediction, it won't matter if philosophers disagree about theory-content that doesn't play any role in generating that prediction. But on the other hand one might well expect there to be relevant disagreements over theory-content for many of the debates in question. As I noted in §1, the conceptual space available to us when we consider the content of a given theory is extremely large. Philosophers cannot agree on even the type of thing theories are made up of (even philosophers working in the same sub-discipline, e.g.
philosophy of physics-the debates discussed in § §2 and 3 are cases in point). And alongside these large differences of opinion on theory content, debates about the properties of/relations between theories are usually extremely sensitive to the content that is ascribed to the theories in question. The slightest change in content can make the difference to whether a theory is inconsistent, deterministic, time-reversal-invariant, and so on, or to whether two theories are equivalent, mutually inconsistent, reducible one to the other, etc.
With these considerations in mind it is no surprise that concrete examples in the literature are not hard to find. In addition to general considerations which suggest that there will be many such examples, I can here add a few more concrete examples to those already given. First, consider the consistency of Bohr's theory of the atom. Lakatos (1970 ), Brown (1992 ), Priest (2002 ), and Da Costa and French (2003 claim that it is inconsistent, whereas Bartelborth (1989), and Hettema (1995) claim that it isn't. Who is right? It depends on which parts of CED we include as part of Bohr's theory. Bartelborth argues that only 'quasi-electrostatics' should be admitted, whereas Brown suggests that the whole of CED must be included because there were applications of old quantum theory where CED was used. The question arises whether we have an internally inconsistent theory, or two theories (Bohr's theory and CED) which are mutually inconsistent. But even if we take the 'one theory' view, we don't have an inconsistency if we interpret some of the '=' symbols as '≈' symbols, a move that Muller (2007) urges: [P] hysicists are notoriously sloppy in this respect: a majority of the exact equality signs (=) in most physics papers, articles, and books mean approximate equality (≈).
(p.261)
So whether we should refer to 'Bohr's theory' as inconsistent depends crucially on one's views about how one should decide upon and interpret the content of the theory. And one finds multiple disagreements on just this issue in the relevant literature.
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Consider also the question of whether Bohr's theory predicts the intensities of the hydrogen spectral lines. Smith (1988) argues that it does because it includes (a particular formulation of) the correspondence principle. But compare Shapere (1977) :
[T]he Bohr theory offered no way to account for the intensities and polarizations of the spectral lines… Use of the correspondence principle as a basis for calculating the polarizations of the lines is not considered here as a 'part of the theory. ' (p.559) Whether the theory makes the prediction or not (and hence whether it might be confirmed/disconfirmed) depends on your view of what the theory is. And philosophers really do disagree on the content of the theory in such a way that they disagree on whether the theory makes the prediction in question.
As a final example-this time concerning a relation between two different theoriesconsider the debate as to whether Heisenberg's matrix mechanics and Schrödinger's wave mechanics are equivalent. The common assumption that Schrödinger in 1926 proved the equivalence of the theories has been labelled 'a myth' by Muller (1997a Muller ( , 1997b , but yet we do have an equivalence according to Perovic (2008 reasons why it's interesting and important that the specified set of analysanda has the property it does-so it adds nothing to the importance of the claim if that set is the theory, and it takes nothing away if it isn't." (mutatis mutandis for relations between sets of analysanda).
But in addition one might wonder whether we lose the ability to ask whether the set of analysanda in question would have been (or is) referred to as (part of) 'the theory' by scientists.
One might be concerned that, since one can't use the term 'theory', one can't ask this question, and so one loses the ability to consider a sense in which the established result (e.g. inconsistency of a set) has historical relevance. In other words one might think that without using the term 'theory' one can't properly fill in that all-important third set of square brackets.
But this is to mix up asking questions about theories and asking questions about how certain terms such as 'theory' and 'classical mechanics' were used by practitioners in the history of science. Theory eliminativism rules out conceiving of the history of science as containing theories as things that exist (in some sense) and have properties, stand in relations, etc. But it does not rule out questions about the way scientists use/used terms such as 'theory' and 'classical mechanics', or how they thought these terms referred. In the course of filling in that third set of square brackets one might want to start by arguing that scientists working at the time referred to the specified assumptions as 'the theory'. One would then have to make the case that this leads to important and/or interesting conclusions. In general, in filling in this third set of square brackets, it's going to be more important to consider which analysanda scientists used, how they used them, whether they believed them, and so on; it's not going to be so important to consider how scientists used certain terms to refer. But theory eliminativism, properly understood, does not rule this out.
Indeed, theory eliminativism does not even rule out contemporary philosophers making use of terms such as 'the theory' and 'formulation of the theory'-one might follow the suggested model and then simply add "and I call this set of analysanda '(a formulation of) the theory'." In that case the term in question is just being used as a label, and doesn't carry any conceptual weight. However, I don't recommend this approach: it presents a danger because many readers will insist that that's an improper use of the term. In fact, in the debate over CED, Frisch tells us explicitly how he is using the term 'theory' (2005, p.26) but this didn't stop Muller and Belot responding 'That's not the theory!' (give or take).
These considerations go some way towards indicating why nothing of significance will be left behind if we reformulate debates of the relevant type. Some readers may think they don't go far enough. But given the potential benefits of theory eliminativism, and the concrete examples provided above (and also in Vickers 2013), perhaps it will not be too much to shift the burden of proof at this stage. Despite the fact that we are asked to manage without a concept which is currently ubiquitous in the literature, why should we expect something to be lost? We may ask:
what can be said in terms of 'theory', that cannot be said in terms of analysanda (equations, models, propositions, etc.) which are being put together and considered as a group in a particular context for particular purposes? I put it to the objector to provide such examples. One example would not do, since I am not arguing that theory eliminativism should be applied to every debate of the relevant type: to repeat, I am only claiming here that we should expect the benefits of reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of debates of the relevant type. And it wouldn't be enough if the cost is small, since I've already indicated the significant benefits one might expect.
This covers the principal benefits and costs. How do they bear on my conclusion that we should expect the benefits of a theory-eliminating reformulation to heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of debates of the relevant type? I use the word 'heavily', since the costs are almost non-existent (I have found nothing of significance that is left behind), and the benefits can be enormous (dissolution of stalemates in the literature; emergence of new questions which force philosophers to engage more directly and seriously with science and the history of science, and thus to consider more carefully the deep reasons why we should care about their conclusions). I say a 'highly significant number' for two reasons: first, I expect-given what I said about the sheer number of different ways in which philosophers can and do disagree about the content of theories, and the apparent ubiquity of examples of such disagreements affecting debates in the literature-that many of the debates I mentioned in §1 will benefit from theory eliminativism. But second, it would be highly significant if just a few debates benefited, since the reformulation of these debates would fruitfully re-direct the research energy of a large number of philosophers in the field. For a concrete example one need only reflect on how things would have developed if Frisch (2005) had followed the eliminativist model.
Objections and Replies
Responses to some of the most obvious objections are embedded in the clarifications of the previous section. Some further possible objections are considered below.
Objection 1. "Theory eliminativism does resolve certain problems, as claimed, but these problems get resolved anyway in the natural course of philosophical debate." I should perhaps emphasise that I do not claim that theory eliminativism is the only way to circumvent miscommunication and dissolve stalemates based on the identity of theories. It is just a way to achieve these ends quickly and effectively. And since I do not claim that the benefits of theory eliminativism will always outweigh the costs, I will happily grant that sometimes the problems will be quickly resolved without eliminating the theory-concept. But theory eliminativism is worth taking seriously if there are some other times when the problems would not be resolved quickly without eliminating the theory-concept. And in addition one needs to factor in the benefit concerning the justification for targeting a particular set of analysanda. In this case there isn't an obvious disagreement crying out for resolution, as in the case of a miscommunication or stalemate. Instead there is simply an important question which is not being asked. Can we sit back, confident that it will be asked, and answered, in the natural course of philosophical debate?
Since there is no obvious disagreement there is every chance it will remain ignored or overlooked for a significant period of time, especially if protagonists tend to think one can justify targeting certain analysanda by simply saying "They are the theory" (cf. the concrete examples discussed above). Theory eliminativism ensures protagonists have something far more substantial to say about why exactly their chosen analysanda deserve attention in the context of the specific debate in question.
Objection 2. "If there's a problem with the way people are thinking about theories, which is then affecting other debates, why not put our energy into clarifying what a theory is, drawing on theories of theories or conceptual analysis?" Nickles (2002, pp.8-11 ) makes this suggestion for debates about inconsistency in science. We should sort out our theory of theories first, he says, since if theories turn out to be families of models then they won't even be the kind of thing which can be inconsistent. But this is too optimistic: it asks us to shelve our debates about the properties and relations of particular theories until we know what theories are. But eighty years of work in philosophy of science has brought us nowhere near to a consensus on the nature and structure of theories. And even such a consensus would not tell us how to identify the particular constituents of a particular theory. This is not to rule out literature on 'theories of theories' as worthless: it can still play an important role in any reformulated debate. Giere (1988) can put together a family of abstract 'scientific' models as his analysanda, and Muller (2011) can put together a "set of structures in the domain of discourse of axiomatic set-theory, characterised by a set-theoretical predicate." What is left behind is any claim that one is focusing on these things because 'that's what a theory is'. Instead, the point of focusing on these things must be argued much more explicitly, by way of filling in that third set of square brackets.
Turning to conceptual analysis, one wouldn't even know which theory of concepts to start with to attempt a conceptual analysis of theory: options include neo-classical theory, prototype theory, the theory theory, the neo-empiricist view, and conceptual atomism. Then there is the question of the relationship between the concept theory, the concept of a particular theory (e.g.
classical electrodynamics), and the content that should be ascribed to a particular theory. This is not a helpful solution; it is a minefield. Kenat (1987) and Suppe (1989) who (drawing on a paper by Sylvain Bromberger) distinguish two types of theory: 'Theories1' are 'theories as techniques for developing answers to problems', and 'Theories2' are 'propositions'.
We might then index these theory-concepts, and say that CED 1 is inconsistent, and CED 2 is consistent.
This may seem like a good solution on the surface, but the details tell a different story. Do we expect that we will find a manageably finite number of theory-concepts, analogous to the three major species-concepts, or the three major acid-concepts? Given the multitude of disagreement already noted, this seems optimistic. The overarching question is, how should we identify and index (some of) the different theory-concepts? Obviously 'theories as techniques for developing answers to problems' and 'theories as propositions' are too vague to be useful (descriptions of) theory-concepts. However, one may also ask how useful more specific theory-concepts are, such as 'a theory i is a set of propositions put forward as serious candidates for the explanatory truth of a given domain of phenomena, and the deductive closure thereof'. This will still lead us to very little determinate content for a given theory, since we will have to ask just how 'serious' the candidacy is, just what is meant in real terms by 'put forward', how we delineate the 'given' domain of phenomena, and so on.
Even if we could identify and index theory-concepts, the big question for this paper is whether pluralism could help us resolve debates about the properties of, and relations between, particular theories. The main problem here is that pluralism is going in the wrong direction:
philosophers of science don't first think of a theory-concept and then apply it to reveal a given to do what we wanted them to do: the idea was that delineating a plurality of theory-concepts could help us identify legitimate decisions on theory content, not the other way around.
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Finally, one might argue that pluralism about theory-concepts in general is little help, but pluralism about particular theories is more help. The idea here would be that one can delineate different 'contents' for any given theory, without any overarching general theory of theorycontent explaining these different 'contents' (since that would just bring us back to a general theory-concept pluralism). Instead one would have to justify why, in the context of a given debate, it was appropriate to focus on a given number of analysanda. In fact this just brings us to the theory-eliminativism advocated here: if one has specified the precise content one is considering, and explained why it is appropriate to consider it in the given context, calling that content 'a formulation of the theory' is to use this locution as a mere label for the specified content. Otherwise the particular-theory pluralist has closely related problems to the theoryconcept pluralist: she is committed to a plurality of individuals, all of which deserve the title 'formulation of the theory' for some reason that requires articulation. 'innate'-eliminativism, 'belief'-eliminativism, etc.), and (ii) it is selective in the sense that it is only to be applied when there is a warrant for it. However, my sense is that the proposal is close enough to other eliminativisms that 'theory eliminativism' is a perfectly sensible term. For example, in Machery (2009) the motivation for 'concept eliminativism' is partly pragmatic, and so application will be selective (dependent on pragmatic factors), just like theory eliminativism.
Conclusion
These are necessarily preliminary considerations, and as such it is important to be neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic. Too optimistic and one is in danger of making overblown claims about a revolution in philosophy of science, a discipline which traditionally has put heavy weight on the concept scientific theory. Too pessimistic, and one may miss an opportunity. If, as I claim, the benefits of theory eliminativism will heavily outweigh the costs for a highly significant number of debates of the relevant type, then that would be remarkable. The two concrete examples of § §2 and 3, together with the general considerations of §4, persuade me that we have good reason to expect highly significant consequences to result from wider employment of theory eliminativism. But even if I'm overly optimistic, concerted action is warranted if there is but a small chance of a highly significant impact.
